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Abstract
Many of the computing systems programmed using Machine Learning are opaque: it is 
difficult to know why they do what they do or how they work. The Explainable Artificial 
Intelligence research program aims to develop analytic techniques with which to render 
opaque computing systems transparent, but lacks a normative framework with which to 
evaluate these techniques’ explanatory success. The aim of the present discussion is to 
develop such a framework, while paying particular attention to different stakeholders’ 
distinct explanatory requirements. Building on an analysis of ‘opacity’ from philosophy 
of science, this framework is modeled after David Marr’s influential account of 
explanation in cognitive science. Thus, the framework distinguishes between the 
different questions that might be asked about an opaque computing system, and 
specifies the general way in which these questions should be answered. By applying this 
normative framework to current techniques such as input heatmapping, feature-
detector identification, and diagnostic classification, it will be possible to determine 
whether and to what extent the Black Box Problem can be solved.
1. Introduction
Computing systems programmed using Machine Learning (ML) are increasingly capable 
of solving complex problems in Artificial Intelligence (AI). Unfortunately, these systems 
remain characteristically opaque: it is difficult to “look inside” so as to understand why 
they do what they do or how they work.
Opacity is the heart of the Black Box Problem—a problem with significant 
practical, legal, and theoretical consequences. Practically, end-users are less likely to 
trust and cede control to machines whose workings they do not understand (Burrell, 
2016; Ribeiro, Singh, & Guestrin, 2016), and software engineers may be unable to 
intervene in order to quickly and systematically improve performance (Hohman, Kahng, 
Pienta, & Chau, 2018). Legally, opacity prevents regulatory bodies from determining 
whether a particular system processes data fairly and securely (Rieder & Simon, 2017), 
and may hinder end-users from exercising their rights under the European Union’s 
General Data Protection Regulation (European Commission, 2016). Theoretically, the 
Black Box Problem makes it difficult to evaluate the potential similarity between 
artificial neural networks and biological brains (Buckner, 2018), and to determine the 
extent to which computers being developed using ML may be considered genuinely 
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intelligent (Zednik, 2018).
Investigators within the Explainable AI (XAI) research program intend to ward off 
these consequences through the use of analytic techniques with which to render opaque
computing systems transparent.1 Although the XAI research program has already 
commanded significant attention (Burrell, 2016; Doran, Schulz, & Besold, 2017; Lipton, 
2016; Ras, van Gerven, & Haselager, 2018; Zerilli, Knott, Maclaurin, & Gavaghan, 2018), 
important normative questions remain unanswered. Most fundamentally, it remains 
unclear how Explainable AI should explain: what is required to render opaque computing 
systems transparent? Given different stakeholders’ distinct reasons for interacting with 
such computing systems, these stakeholders will require different kinds of explanations. 
Moreover, it remains unclear how explanation in this context relates to other epistemic 
achievements such as description, prediction, intervention, and understanding—each of 
which might be more or less important in different domains, for different stakeholders, 
and with respect to different systems. Finally, it remains unclear what the prospects are 
of actually explaining the behavior of ML-programmed computing systems as they 
become increasingly powerful, sophisticated, and widespread.
The present discussion contributes to the maturation of the Explainable AI 
research program by developing a normative framework for rendering opaque 
computing systems transparent. This framework accommodates different stakeholders’ 
distinct explanatory requirements, and specifies the questions that should be answered 
in order to ward off the Black Box Problems practical and theoretical consequences. 
Notably, inspiration will be sought in cognitive science. Indeed, insofar as the problem of
rendering opaque computing systems transparent is not unlike the problem of 
explaining the behavior of humans and other biological cognizers, the Explainable AI 
research program can benefit from co-opting some of the norms and practices of 
cognitive science (see also Rahwan et al., 2019).
The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2 builds on previous philosophical 
work by Paul Humphreys (2009) to analyze the oft-used but nevertheless ill-understood 
notions of ‘opacity’ and ‘transparency’. Section 3 then invokes Tomsett et al.’s (2018) 
notion of an ‘ML ecosystem’ to distinguish between the stakeholders who are most likely
to seek explanations of a particular system’s behavior. It also introduces David Marr’s 
(1982) levels of analysis account of explanation in cognitive science so as to better 
understand these stakeholders’ distinct explanatory requirements. Indeed, different 
stakeholders in the ML ecosystem can be aligned with different questions in Marr’s 
account—questions about what, why, how, and where a computer program is carried out.
Sections 4 and 5 then introduce and evaluate the explanatory contributions of several 
current analytic techniques from Explainable AI: layer-wise relevance propagation 
(Montavon, Samek, & Müller, 2018), local interpretable model-agnostic explanation 
1 There are two distinct streams within the Explainable AI research program. The present discussion 
focuses on attempts to solve the Black Box Problem by analyzing computing systems so as to render 
them transparent post hoc, i.e., after they have been developed or deployed. In contrast, the discussion
will not consider efforts to avoid the Black Box Problem altogether, by modifying the relevant ML 
methods so that the computers being programmed do not become opaque in the first place (for 
discussion see, e.g., Doran, Schulz, & Besold, 2017). 
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(Ribeiro et al., 2016), feature-detector identification (Bau et al., 2018), and diagnostic 
classification (Hupkes, Veldhoen, & Zuidema, 2018).2 Indeed, these sections show that 
different XAI techniques are capable of answering distinct questions, and thus, are likely 
to satisfy different stakeholders’ explanatory requirements.
2. The Black Box Problem in Artificial Intelligence
2.1 From Machine Learning to the Black Box Problem
The Black Box Problem is traditionally said to arise when the computing systems that are
used used to solve problems in AI are opaque. This manner of speaking is grounded in 
the metaphorical intuition that a system’s behavior can be explained by “looking inside” 
so as to understand why it does what it does or how it works. Although most computing 
systems are constructed from well-understood hardware components that afford no 
literal obstacle to “looking inside”, they might nevertheless be considered opaque in the 
sense that it is difficult to know exactly how they are programmed.
Machine Learning is just one approach among many for programming computers 
that solve complex problems in AI. Unlike their colleagues working within other AI 
approaches, however, developers in Machine Learning exert limited influence on the way
in which the relevant problems are solved. Of course, ML developers must decide on 
basic architectural principles such as whether the system takes the form of a deep neural
network, a support vector machine, a decision tree, or some other kind of system with a 
particular set of learnable parameters. Moreover, they must choose an appropriate 
learning algorithm, and must identify a suitable learning environment, in which the 
learnable parameters can obtain values with which to solve the problem at hand. 
Nevertheless, ML developers do not typically decide on the particular values these 
parameters eventually obtain (e.g. the weights of individual network connections), and 
in this sense, do not wholly determine the way in which the problem is actually solved.
This relative lack of influence is a great advantage insofar as Machine Learning 
methods are often capable of identifying highly unintuitive and subtle solutions that are 
unlikely to be found using more traditional methods. Indeed, it is this capability that 
explains the recent influx of Machine Learning in many different domains, as well as its 
great promise for society as a whole.3 Unfortunately, however, this great advantage also 
2 This is by no means a comprehensive list of techniques, and inclusion in this list should not be taken to 
indicate that these techniques are superior to others. Indeed, XAI is an incredibly dynamic field in 
which original and increasingly powerful techniques are being developed almost on a daily basis. But 
although not all relevant XAI techniques can be considered here, the normative framework being 
developed is meant to apply generally, including to those techniques that have not been considered or
that may not have yet been developed.
3 Domains in which ML-programmed systems have recently had a great, if not revolutionary, influence 
include game-playing, autonomous driving and flying, question-answering, natural language 
processing, machine vision, behavior-prediction, and product-recommendation, among many others. 
That said, successes within these domains should not, of course, be taken to imply that Machine 
Learning methods are all-conquering. Indeed, many important AI problems remain unsolved, and in 
many cases, it is unclear whether, and if so how, ML methods could ever be used to solve them. Indeed,
in many problem domains, traditional AI methods remain far more effective than the methods 
developed in Machine Learning (for discussion see, e.g., Lake, Ullman, Tenenbaum, & Gershman, 2017; 
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comes at a significant cost. Unlike the computing systems being programmed using 
more traditional methods, the systems being programmed using Machine Learning are 
characteristically opaque.
On the face of it, the reasons for this characteristic opacity are obvious. Because 
developers exert relatively limited influence on the setting of parameter values, they 
might not know how these parameters contribute to the system’s behavior. In addition, 
even if individual parameter values are known, the fact that they might interact 
nonlinearly as well as recurrently means that it is almost impossible to understand, 
predict, or systematically intervene on the way in which a particular input is transformed 
so as to generate a particular output.
Upon closer inspection, however, it is clear that a system’s opacity cannot be 
reduced to an ML developers’ knowledge of parameter values. For example, many deep 
neural networks have been found to learn high-level representations that capture 
abstract properties of the learning environment, but that do not map neatly onto 
individual parameter values (see, e.g., Bau et al., 2018; Buckner, 2018). In such cases, 
knowledge of the relevant representations is arguably far more relevant for the 
purposes of explaining the system’s behavior than knowledge of individual connection 
weights.4 In addition, it is not clear that ML developers are the only stakeholders with 
respect to which to assess a particular system’s opacity. Many other stakeholders, from 
end-users to regulatory bodies, are likely to seek a better understand of a particular 
system’s behavior, despite being unable or unwilling to acquire knowledge of the 
system’s learnable parameters. Thus, although it may be tempting to reduce a system’s 
opacity to a developer’s knowledge of learnable parameters, opacity is in fact a highly 
nuanced phenomenon that bears clarification. What is required, in other words, is a 
better understanding of the dual notions of ‘opacity’ and ‘transparency’, and thus, a 
better understanding of the Black Box Problem itself.
2.2 What is the Black Box Problem?
One of the most influential recent analyses of ‘opacity’ is due to Paul Humphreys (2009). 
Although Humphreys’ work is primarily concerned with computer simulations in 
scientific disciplines such as high-energy physics and molecular biology, his analysis of 
‘opacity’ is also a useful starting point for discussions of the Black Box Problem in 
Artificial Intelligence. On Humphreys’ analysis, computing systems are
“opaque relative to a cognitive agent X at time t just in case X does not know at t 
all of the epistemically relevant elements of the [system]” (Humphreys, 2009, p. 
618).5
Marcus, 2018)
4 Indeed, ML developers typically do have access to the values of learnable parameters. Nevertheless, 
these developers are often the first to call for additional explanations so as to, e.g., demonstrate that 
a system does in fact do what it is supposed to do (see Section 4), or to improve its performance when 
it does not (See Section 5 and Hohman, Kahng, Pienta, & Chau, 2018).
5 Humphreys subsequently introduces the notion of essential epistemic opacity, which applies to 
systems whose epistemically relevant elements are not only unknown to the agent, but that are in fact
impossible to know by that agent (Humphreys 2009, p. 618). Notably, Humphreys' notion of possibility 
is not logical, but practical—it depends on an agent's limited time, money, and computational power, 
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Two features of this analysis are worth emphasizing. First, opacity is agent-relative. That 
is, a computing system is never opaque in and of itself, but opaque only with respect to 
some particular agent. Second, opacity is an epistemic property: it concerns the agent’s 
(lack of) knowledge. According to Humphreys, this knowledge concerns the system’s 
epistemically relevant elements (EREs). Although Humphreys does not further analyze the
notion of an epistemically relevant element, it can be fleshed out in a way that suits 
current purposes. Thus, an element can be understood as, for example, a step in the 
process of transforming inputs to outputs, or as a momentary state-transition within the
system’s overall evolution over time. An epistemically relevant element is one which is 
not only known to the agent, but which can be cited by him or her to explain the 
occurrence of some other element, or of the system’s overall output.
The term ‘explain’ is left intentionally ambiguous. A computing system’s 
epistemically relevant elements may take the form of physical structures, mathematical 
states-of-affairs, or even reasons—among many other things. Accordingly, the presence 
or absence of any such element might be explained physically (e.g. by appealing to the 
magnetization of hardware registers), mathematically (e.g. by appealing to binary 
strings), or even rationally (e.g. by appealing to the possibility that the relevant binary 
string represents a particular goal state). In general, different kinds of explanations 
invoke different kinds of EREs, and different kinds of EREs are likely to be appropriate to
different agents and to different systems.
Two notes on the ambiguity of ‘explain’. First, for any given system, many 
different EREs can be considered equally “real”, and thus, many different explanations 
can be considered equally legitimate. By way of analogy to the computing system just 
above, the behavior of humans and other biological cognizers can also be explained 
physically (e.g. by reference to neurobiological mechanisms), mathematically (e.g. by 
reference to computational processes), and rationally (e.g. by reference to beliefs and 
desires). Staunchly reductionist or eliminativist philosophical tendencies 
notwithstanding (e.g., Bickle, 2006; Churchland, 1981), all of these explanations are 
equally legitimate, and the EREs invoked therein are equally “real”. The situation in 
Explainable AI is analogous: many different kinds of explanations can and should be 
considered legitimate for the purposes of rendering opaque computing systems 
transparent.
But although many different kinds of explanations are equally legitimate, not all 
of them are likely to be equally useful for any individual agent. Whereas some agents 
may in fact seek to explain a computing system’s behavior by invoking as EREs the values
of learnable parameters, many other agents—in particular, agents with more limited 
cognitive resources, with a more limited understanding of computer programming, or 
with altogether different goals and interests—will require rather different explanations.
among other resources (see, e.g., Durán & Formanek, 2018). For this reason, analytic techniques from 
XAI that allow an agent to use these resources more efficiently are poised to reduce the scope of the 
impossible, all while allowing that some systems may remain opaque even after the most powerful 
techniques have been applied. That said, the present discussion need not speculate about the scope of
the impossible. The primary aim of this discussion is to show how systems that can be rendered 
transparent should be rendered transparent.
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Thus, whereas some agents might be satisfied by explanations that cite a system’s 
parameter values, others are likely to prefer explanations that cite higher-order 
representations. Moreover, some agents may require explanations that invoke the 
physical properties of hardware components, whereas others may instead invoke 
explanations that cite environmental features such as objects, colors, persons, or 
intentions. Thus, the ambiguity in the term ‘explain’ shows why the notions of ‘opacity’ 
and ‘transparency’ cannot be properly understood solely by considering developers’ 
(lack of) knowledge of learnable parameters: For many agents, learnable parameters are 
simply not the right kind of ERE for the purposes of rendering opaque computing 
systems transparent. 
The discussion so far shows that the sense in which computing systems are 
opaque—and thus, the sense in which they should be rendered transparent—differs 
between agents. At the same time, the outline of a general solution to the Black Box 
Problem is already beginning to taking shape: In order to render an opaque computing 
system transparent, a particular agent must seek knowledge of an appropriate set of 
epistemically relevant elements with which to explain that system’s behavior. Two 
questions must be answered before this outline can be fleshed out into a normative 
framework for Explainable AI. Which agents are concerned with explaining the behavior 
of computers programmed using Machine Learning? What are, for these agents, the 
appropriate epistemically relevant elements? By answering these two questions, it will 
eventually be possible to determine how Explainable AI should explain, and to evaluate 
the explanatory success of current and future XAI analytic techniques.
3. From Machine Learning to Marr
3.1. What are the stakeholders?
Tomsett et al. (2018) provide a helpful taxonomy of agents within the ML ecosystem—
that is, a taxonomy of stakeholders who depend on or regularly interact with a 
computing system developed using Machine Learning. Six kinds of stakeholders are 
distinguished according to their unique roles within the ML ecosystem (Figure 1), and 
Tomsett et al. illustrate these stakeholders’ roles by invoking the example of a loan risk 
assessment system. Indeed, the risk assessment system is a typical, albeit relatively 
simple, ML application: A supervised learning algorithm can be used quite 
straightforwardly to correlate previous applicants’ personal data such as income, age, 
and home address with their eventual ability to repay loans in a timely manner. On the 
basis of such correlations, the automated loan risk assessment system can take a new 
individual’s personal data as input, and generate an output to estimate the financial risk 
a bank would incur by accepting that individual’s loan application.
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In the risk assessor’s ecosystem, bank employees are operators and/or executors. 
Operators are agents who “provide the system with inputs, and directly receive the 
system’s outputs” (Tomsett et al., 2018, p. 10). These are likely to include bank tellers 
tasked with entering a particular applicant’s personal data into the system, and with 
receiving the system’s output. In contrast, executors are “agents who make decisions 
that are informed by the machine learning system” (Tomsett et al., 2018, p. 10). These 
are likely to include back-office employees who rely on the system’s output to make 
data-driven decisions about whether or not to accept a particular application.
Another important agent in the ML ecosystem is the decision-subject. In the 
present example, the decision-subject is the loan applicant: the individual whose data 
are being processed for the purposes of assessing risk, and who is subject to the 
executor’s final decision. Decision-subjects are distinguished from data-subjects, 
individuals whose personal data are contained in the learning environment. In the loan-
application example, data-subjects include previous applicants whose personal data and 
loan-repayment behavior ground the risk assessor’s learned correlations.
Creators are the developers of the computing system. These include software 
engineers responsible for designing the learning algorithm and for selecting the learning
environment. They are also likely to include system administrators responsible for 
maintaining and possibly fine-tuning the system once it has been deployed. Of course, 
creators might also include hardware engineers tasked with building and maintaining the
hardware in which the risk assessor is implemented. That said, many current ML 
applications are driven by standard-issue hardware components whose workings require 
no ML-specific knowledge.6 Perhaps for this reason, Tomsett et al. (2018) do not 
explicitly consider creators of this kind.
Finally, examiners are “agents tasked with compliance/safety-testing, auditing, or 
6 Applications that depend on ML-specific hardware components are considered in Section 5.
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Figure 1: The ML ecosystem. Reproduced from Tomsett et al. 
(2018).
forensically investigating a system” (Tomsett et al., 2018, p. 13). Thus, examiners are 
likely to include regulatory bodies charged with determining that the risk assessment 
system conforms to, for example, data privacy regulations, anti-discrimination laws, and 
policies designed to prevent financial fraud. Given legislative innovations such as the EU 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), examiners are likely to play an increasingly 
prominent role in future ecosystems.
3.2. What are the epistemically relevant elements?
In order to perform their designated roles in the ecosystem, every stakeholder must 
possess a particular kind of knowledge. More precisely, every stakeholder must possess 
knowledge of appropriate epistemically relevant elements. Consider again the loan risk 
assessor. Bank tellers tasked with entering inputs and receiving outputs can only 
operate the system if they know, for example, something about the INCOME, D.O.B. and 
HOME_ADDRESS variables (in particular, their type), and that the most important output
(the output whose value is to be passed on to the back-office executor) is the value of 
the RISK variable. In contrast, software engineers charged with developing, maintaining 
and improving the risk assessor’s behavior must be able to identify, characterize, and 
intervene on the variables—system parameters and/or high-level representations—that 
mediate the transformation of inputs to outputs. Perhaps surprisingly, most other 
agents are less likely to be concerned with the system’s variables than with the 
environmental features that are represented by those variables. In particular, although 
executors, examiners, data- and decision-subjects may not need to know much about 
variables such as INCOME, D.O.B., HOME_ADDRESS, and RISK, but will have to know 
something about (their own or their customers’) income levels and demographic 
information, and eventually, about the level of financial risk associated therewith.
Given that they must possess a particular kind of knowledge, opacity—a lack of 
knowledge—prevents every kind of stakeholder from performing their designated role 
in the ecosystem.7 If a bank teller does not know that an applicant’s date of birth must 
be entered YYYYMMDD rather than DDMMYYYY, he or she will be unable to correctly 
operate the system so as to generate meaningful outputs. If a back-office executor does 
not know that an output value of 0.794 designates a relatively high level of financial risk,
he or she will be unable to make an appropriate decision with respect to a particular loan
application. If current applicants (i.e., decision-subjects) are unable to acquire knowledge
of the factors that contribute to particular decisions, they might not be able to exercise 
their GDPR right to explanation (Goodman & Flaxman, 2016; but cf. Wachter, Mittelstadt, 
& Floridi, 2017). Similarly, if previous applicants (i.e., data-subjects) are unable to acquire 
knowledge of the personal data that is stored in the learning environment, they will not 
be in a position to exercise their GDPR right to information. If examiners such as lawyers 
or regulatory bodies cannot discern whether the loan risk assessment system has 
7 Some commentators deny that opacity prevents stakeholders other than creators from fulfilling their 
roles (see, e.g., Zerilli, Knott, Maclaurin, & Gavaghan, 2018). However, these commentators fail to 
recognize the diversity of stakeholders within the ML ecosystem, and thus, the different senses in 
which computing systems may be opaque, as well as the different reasons for rendering these systems
transparent.
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learned to correlate a foreign place of birth with high level of financial risk, they will be 
unable to identify, and if necessary sanction, possible discrimination. Finally, software 
engineers who do not know the variables that mediate causally between a system’s 
inputs and outputs—be they individual system parameters or high-level representations
—will be unable to efficiently modify the system’s performance so as to bring it in line 
with the lawyer’s legal recommendations.
Where opacity is the problem, transparency is the solution. Thus, stakeholders 
should seek explanations—they should render the relevant computing system 
transparent. Of course, given that the knowledge required to perform their roles differs 
between stakeholders, so too will the knowledge that should be sought. In particular, 
different stakeholders should seek knowledge of different kinds of epistemically 
relevant elements. But although the appropriate EREs may be apparent enough in the 
context of the loan-application example, in order to extend the discussion to other 
(potentially more complex) examples—and thus, to understand in a more general sense 
of what is required to render computing systems transparent—it will be necessary to 
attain a deeper understanding of the different kinds of knowledge that different 
stakeholders require in order to fulfill their designated roles within the ML ecosystem.8
3.3. Toward a Marrian framework for Explainable AI
One way of attaining such a deeper understanding is to adopt a more general 
explanatoryframework. Consider David Marr’s (1982) levels of analysis account, which 
specifies norms that should be satisfied in order to explain the behavior of cognitive 
systems as diverse as the human visual system and the sensorimotor system of the 
house fly. Notably, despite having been developed almost four decades ago, Marr’s 
account remains influential in cognitive science today, and there are reasons to believe 
that it can serve double-duty as a normative framework for Explainable AI in the future. 
For one, like many biological cognizers, the computing systems being developed in 
Artificial Intelligence can be viewed as information-processing systems in which inputs 
are systematically transformed into outputs.9 For another, like the computers being 
programmed using Machine Learning, biological cognizers are opaque in the sense that 
8 Although the present discussion distinguishes between the explanatory requirements of different 
kinds of stakeholders, there may also be differences between the explanatory requirements of any 
two individuals, even if they are stakeholders of the same kind. In particular, differences in the 
background knowledge, training, and preferences of individuals are likely to influence the receptivity 
of these individuals to specific kinds of explanations. But although such individual differences are 
undeniably interesting and relevant, the present discussion will not consider them further, and will 
instead only focus on the the differences that arise between different kinds of stakeholders due to 
their distinct roles.
9 Notably, in order to illustrate and motivate his framework, Marr himself did not only invoke biological 
cognizers, but also invoked engineered computing systems such as the supermarket cash register. 
Indeed, the agents who regularly interact with the cash register are closely analogous to the agents in 
the ML ecosystem: the supermarket employees who operate the register are like operators and/or 
executors; customers are like decision subjects; the software or hardware engineers charged with 
constructing and maintaining the cash register are like creators; financial regulatory bodies such as tax 
auditors are examiners. Although there exist important disanalogies (e.g. the supermarket cash 
register has no data-subjects), the fact that Marr’s framework is in part motivated by its applicability to
engineered systems can be viewed as an additional reason to believe that may also be useful when 
articulating a normative framework for Explainable AI.
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we still do not know exactly why they do what they do or how they work (Zerilli et al., 
2018).
That said, the most important reason for thinking that Marr’s account of 
explanation in cognitive science can serve double-duty as a normative framework for 
Explainable AI is that the account is sufficiently multi-faceted to illuminate the subtle 
differences between the knowledge required by different stakeholders. Indeed, Marr’s 
account centers on the answering of several different questions at three distinct levels of
analysis (McClamrock, 1991; Shagrir, 2010; Zednik, 2017). Insofar as different 
stakeholders can be thought to ask different kinds of questions, the characteristic 
answers described by Marr can be used to better understand the different kinds of EREs 
these stakeholders should invoke in order to render a computing system transparent. 
Indeed, by adopting Marr’s account to evaluate the explanatory contributions of analytic
techniques from Explainable AI, it will be possible to determine exactly which questions 
these techniques are capable of answering, and thus, for which stakeholders and to what
extent the analyzed systems can eventually be rendered transparent.
4. Description and Interpretation: The Computational Level
4.1. Questions about what and why
Marr’s computational level of analysis centers on questions about what a system is doing, 
and on questions about why it does what it does. These questions are intimately related, 
but importantly different. Questions about what a particular system is doing call for a 
description of that system’s overall behavior in terms of, for example, a transition 
function f in which ‘input’ states are mapped onto corresponding ‘output’ states (Figure 
2). In the context of the loan risk assessment system, what-questions are answered by 
specifying the value of the RISK variable that is generated for any particular combination
of input variables such as INCOME, D.O.B., and HOME_ADDRESS.
In contrast, questions about why a system does what it does are questions about 
that behavior’s “appropriateness” within some particular environment (Marr, 1982, p. 
24f). That is, these questions call for an interpretation of the system’s behavior in terms 
of recognizable features of the environment—be this the learning environment that 
(together with the learning algorithm) determines the system’s behavior, or the 
behavioral environment in which the system is eventually deployed. Insofar as what-
questions are answered by specifying a transition function f that maps ‘input’ states 
onto corresponding ‘output’ states, why-questions concern the environmental regularity 
or correlation f’ that obtains between the inputs and outputs themselves. Specifically, 
answering a why-question involves showing that there exists a correspondence between 
f and f’ (Shagrir, 2010. See also Figure 2). Thus for example, in the loan-application 
scenario, why-questions are not answered by describing the values of variables such as 
INCOME, D.O.B., HOME_ADDRESS, and RISK, but rather by interpreting these values in 
terms of features such as a particular applicant’s income, date of birth, home address, 
and level of financial risk.
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It can be helpful to view the correspondence between systems and their 
environments semantically, that is, in representational terms. The system’s ‘input’ and 
‘output’ states may be thought to represent the input received from the environment 
and the output that is generated in response. Likewise, the state-transition f might be 
thought to track the regularity or correlation f’ that obtains between those inputs and 
outputs. Although more can and should be said about the correspondence that obtains 
between a computing system and its environment (for discussion see, e.g., Shagrir, 
2010), for current purposes it suffices to say that whereas what-questions concern local 
properties of the computing system itself—often, its representational vehicles—why-
questions concern features of the surrounding environment—the corresponding 
representational contents.
4.2. Operators, executors, examiners, data- and decision-subjects
This brief presentation of the computational level can already be used to align different 
stakeholders in the ML ecosystem with distinct questions within Marr’s account. For this 
reason, it can be used to better understand the kinds of EREs these agents should 
identify in order to render computing systems transparent.
Insofar as they are tasked with entering inputs and receiving outputs, operators 
are most likely to seek answers to questions about what a computing system is doing. 
That is, their explanatory requirements are satisfied—the system is rendered suitably 
transparent—by describing the inputs that must be entered and the outputs that are 
generated. In contrast, executors and examiners are far more likely to be concerned with
why-questions in which a system’s behavior must be interpreted. To wit, although a back-
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Figure 2. Sin and Sout are the ‘input’ and ‘output’ states of the 
computing system, respectively; input and output are the 
corresponding features of the environment. The solid arrow at the 
bottom designates the overall behavior of the system, presumably 
realized in some causal process. The dotted arrow designates a 
representation (or other kind of correspondence) relationship 
between the system and its environment. What-questions concern 
the transition function f from sin to sout. Why-questions, in contrast, 
concern the relationship f’ between input and output. Adapted 
from Shagrir (2010).
office executor in the loan-application scenario must know that the risk assessment 
system computes a value of 0.794, his or her most important task is to interpret that 
value as an indicator of significant financial risk. Similarly, it is an examiner’s duty to 
determine whether a particular assessment has been generated legitimately, or because 
the system discriminates by associating a foreign place of birth with a high level of 
financial risk.
Data- and decision-subjects are similarly concerned with questions about why 
rather than with questions about what. Since coming into force in May 2018, the GDPR 
empowers data- and decision-subjects to seek answers to why-questions, but does not 
similarly extend to what-questions. In particular, the GDPR right to information allows 
data-subjects to know which personal information is represented, but not how that 
information is entered, represented, and manipulated. Similarly, the GDPR right to 
explanation may allow decision-subjects to know which factors contributed to a 
particular outcome (e.g., a low income may lead to a denied application), but not to the 
particular way in which those factors are represented, or how the outcomes are actually 
calculated.10 Notably, the rationale for focusing on questions about why rather than on 
questions about what (or on questions about how, see Section 5) is compelling: whereas 
my personal data belong to me, the data-structures and processes that are actually used 
to represent and manipulate those data are the property of the AI service provider. 
In summary, the distinction between what-questions and why-questions at the 
computational level captures an important distinction between two different ways of 
rendering a computing system transparent, each of which is appropriate for different 
stakeholders within the ML ecosystem. Whereas operators typically seek to render a 
system transparent by asking what it does and describing its ‘input’ and ‘output’ states, 
many other agents do so by asking why it does what it does and interpreting those 
states in terms of environmental features and regularities. Perhaps surprisingly, given 
the metaphorical underpinnings of “opacity” and “black boxes”, this means that for 
several stakeholders in the ML ecosystem, rendering a computing system transparent 
does not involve “looking inside” the system at all, but rather “looking out”, at the 
environment in which that system’s behavior is learned and performed.
4.3. Input heatmapping
Several XAI techniques can be used to answer questions about what and why. One such 
technique is input heatmapping, which highlights the features of a system’s input that 
are particularly relevant to, or predictive of, its output. Some of the most compelling 
10 It is a point of contention to what extent the GDPR right to explanation constitutes a right at all, and if 
so, what it guarantees (Wachter, Mittelstadt, & Floridi, 2017). Although the former is a legal question 
that goes beyond the scope of the present discussion, the latter is a normative question that may 
benefit from the present discussion. In particular, Goodman & Flaxman (2016) argue that the GDPR 
grants data-subjects (and decision-subjects) the right to acquire “meaningful information about the 
logic involved.” However, what exactly is meant by "logic" in this context remains unclear. The present 
discussion implies that the relevant stakeholders should be primarily concerned with why-questions, 
and that in this sense, the "logic" should be specified in terms of learned regularities between 
environmental factors. Moreover, the present discussion suggests that AI service providers may, for 
legal reasons, be compelled to deploy XAI techniques capable of answering why-questions.
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examples of this technique come from the domain of machine vision, in which deep 
neural networks are used to classify pixelated input images according to the people, 
objects, properties, or situations they depict.11 There, input heatmapping typically 
involves the generation of visualizations—i.e., heatmaps—that emphasize the particular 
pixels or pixel regions that are most responsible for a particular classification (Figure 3).
One concrete approach for developing heatmaps for artificial neural networks is 
Layer-wise Relevance Propagation (LRP, Montavon et al., 2018). This method deploys a 
subroutine of the popular backpropagation learning algorithm, in which individual unit 
activations and connection weights are used to calculate the responsibility that the 
individual units of an “upstream” layer li bear for producing particular levels of activity in 
the subsequent “downstream” layer li+1. Given a particular classification at the network’s 
output layer, this subroutine can be deployed in a layer-wise fashion until responsibility-
values are calculated for every unit in the network’s input layer. Insofar as these units 
correspond to, for example, pixels of a particular input image, these responsibility-values
can be used to generate a heatmap that highlights the pixels or pixel regions that bear 
the greatest responsibility for the final classification.
Input heatmaps provide particularly fine-grained answers to questions about 
what a computing system is doing. Recall that questions of this sort are answered by 
specifying the transition function f that obtains between a system’s ‘input’ and ‘output’ 
states. Input heatmaps can help specify f, not in terms of the ‘input’ state as a whole 
11 Although machine vision may be the domain in which input heatmaps are most intuitive, they may also 
be used in other domains. For example, input heatmaps may be constructed for audio inputs, 
highlighting the moments within an audio recording that are most responsible for classifying that 
recording by musical genre. Moreover, although LRP is specifically designed to work with artificial 
neural networks, other methods can be used to generate input heatmaps for other kinds of systems. 
Thus, input heatmapping can be viewed as a general-purpose XAI technique for answering what- and 
why-questions.
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Figure 3. Input heatmaps (right) for various input images (left), 
generated by applying the method of layer-wise relevance 
propagation (LRP) to a deep neural network capable of recognizing 
handwritten digits. Reproduced from Montavon et al. (2018).
(e.g., a whole pixelated image), but in terms of a limited number of elements within that 
state (e.g., individual pixels). Such fine-grained answers to what-questions are 
particularly useful for operators. In particular, they greatly enhance an operator’s ability 
to identify the most likely sources of error. If an error is detected in the ‘output’ state 
(e.g., the RISK value is inappropriately high), it is more likely to result from high-
responsibility elements of the ‘input’ state (e.g., a wrongly-formatted D.O.B. value) than 
from low-responsibility elements (e.g., a misspelled surname). That said, such fine-
grained answers to what-questions might also be exploited by malicious operators such 
as hackers. Indeed, input heatmaps can be used to design adversarial inputs that appear 
typical to human observers, but that nevertheless produce radically divergent (and thus, 
potentially exploitable) outputs due to minor changes to some high-responsibility 
elements (Szegedy et al., 2013).
Notably, input heatmaps can also be used by creators. Creators are regularly 
tasked with improving or otherwise changing a system’s overall behavior, and thus, with 
changing the system’s transition function f. An input heatmap’s fine-grained answers to 
what-questions can be used by creators to identify the necessary changes. Thus for 
example, in order to maximize a system’s processing efficiency and minimize its memory 
load, an input heatmap might be used to determine whether certain aspects of the input
(e.g., pixels at the edge of an image) can be ignored, or whether the memory required to 
store individual inputs can be reduced by, for example, zeroing the values of low-
responsibility elements. Similarly, creators seeking to minimize a system’s susceptibility 
to adversarial inputs could deploy input heatmaps to, for example, determine that the 
responsibility for final classifications should be distributed more evenly across all ‘input’ 
elements. Of course, although creators may invoke input heatmaps to determine the 
particular changes that must be made, they will normally have to use other techniques—
in particular, techniques capable of answering how-questions—in order to know how 
those changes can actually be achieved.
While input heatmapping can be used by stakeholders seeking to better 
understand what a system is doing, this technique can also be used by stakeholders 
interested in knowing why the system does what it does. Recall that why-questions are 
answered by specifying a regularity or correlation f’ that obtains between features of 
the environment, and by showing that this correlation is tracked by the system’s 
transition function f. Input heatmaps can be used to answer why-questions if the 
environmental features that participate in f’ can be discerned by inspecting the map—
that is, if the highlighted elements of the ‘input’ state together “look like” some 
recognizable feature of the environment. Consider again the input heatmaps in Figure 3. 
The highlighted pixels visually resemble handwritten digits. In particular, the highlighted 
pixels in the upper-left heatmap visually resemble a handwritten 2 rather than, for 
example, a handwritten 7. This fact answers a question about why the upper-left input 
image outputs ‘2’ rather than ‘7’: the output is ‘2’ because the image depicts a 2. Stated 
more generally, the input heatmaps in Figure 3 show that the system does what it is in 
fact supposed to do, namely, detect and classify handwritten digits.
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In order to better appreciate the importance of answering why-questions in this 
way, it is worth contrasting the above example with one in which the computing system 
does not in fact do what it is supposed to do. Consider a well-known historical (albeit 
probably apocryphal) example in which a neural network learns to visually distinguish 
enemy tanks from friendly ones.12 Although the network quickly learns to categorize 
images of tanks, it does so by tracking an accidental correlation between tank 
allegiances and weather patterns: whereas the images of friendly tanks were all taken 
on a sunny day, the enemy tanks were photographed under cloud cover. For this reason, 
although the system correctly classifies images (what), its reasons for doing so (why) 
have nothing at all to do with tanks!
In this example, heatmapping techniques such as LRP would be likely to produce 
visualizations in which the highlighted pixels together resemble clouds in the 
background, rather than tanks in the foreground. Several different stakeholders would 
be likely to benefit from such visualizations: executors at military HQ who must 
ultimately decide whether or not to shoot at a particular tank, but also examiners at the 
International Criminal Court tasked with determining whether the resultant action ought
to be considered a war crime. Moreover, tank crews who make up the decision-subjects 
of the tank-classification system could rest easy in their knowledge that the system can 
be trusted, and that they are for this reason less likely to perish in a data-driven barrage 
of friendly fire.
Before moving on to other kinds of questions, it is important to mention a 
significant limitation of the heatmapping technique. Input heatmaps can be used to 
answer why-questions when the highlighted elements together “look like” some 
recognizable feature of the environment. As was already suggested in Section 2, 
however, Machine Learning methods are renowned for their ability to identify and track 
subtle as well as complex features and correlations in the learning environment, many of
which may not be easily recognized or labeled by human observers. In such cases, the 
utility of input heatmapping is likely to be limited, and other XAI techniques may have to 
be invoked. One such technique might be Local Interpretable Model-agnostic Explanations
(LIME, Ribeiro et al., 2016), which can be used to simplify the transition function f (which 
is often nonlinear and therefore difficult to interpret) with a linear approximation that is 
more readily interpretable by human observers. Similarly, Local Rule-Based Explanations 
(LORE, Guidotti et al., 2018) are designed to approximate limited domains of f by sets of 
comprehensible decision-rules. Although these different approximations always only 
capture a system’s behavior for a limited range of inputs, and although as 
approximations they always bear the risk over-simplification and misrepresentation, they
may nevertheless prove useful for answering what- and why- questions even when input 
heatmapping fails.
12 Gwern Branwen maintains a helpful online resource on this particular example, listing different 
versions and assessing their veracity: https://www.gwern.net/Tanks (retrieved January 25th, 2019).
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5. Intervention: The Algorithmic and Implementational Levels
5.1 Questions about how and where
In Marr’s account of explanation in cognitive science, the levels “below” the 
computational level of analysis are the algorithmic and implementational levels. The 
algorithmic level centers on questions about how a system does what it does. Insofar as 
the system’s behavior is described using a transition function f from an ‘input’ state to an
‘output’ state, the algorithmic level aims to uncover the mediating states s1, s2,...sn and 
state-transitions si→sj that appropriately connect ‘input’ and ‘output’ (Figure 4). Put 
differently, the algorithmic level is concerned with uncovering the program that 
executes the overall transition f, and to thereby compute or approximate f’ (Shagrir, 
2010).13
In contrast, the implementational level of analysis centers on questions about 
where the program described at the algorithmic level is realized. Where-questions 
concern the physical components p1, p2,..pm in which states are realized and state-
transitions are performed (Figure 4). Thus, the implementational level is concerned with 
the hardware components that are involved in executing the program for f.
13 The program that mediates between 'input' and 'output'—the program being executed—is not to be 
confused with the learning algorithm that is used to develop (i.e., to program) the system in the first 
place. 
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Figure 4. As in Figure 3, Sin and Sout are the ‘input’ and ‘output’ 
states of the computing system, respectively; input and output are 
the corresponding features of the environment, and the dotted arrow 
designates a representation (or other kind of correspondence) 
relationship between the system and its environment. The squared 
shapes and arrows in the middle designate the individual states and 
state-transitions that are performed to compute or approximate f, 
the description of which answers how-questions. The circles at the 
bottom indicate the physical realizers of individual states and/or 
state-transitions, the identification of which answers where-
questions.
Whereas what- and why-questions can both be answered by “looking out” at a 
system’s surrounding environment, how- and where-questions can only be answered by 
“looking inside”, at the functional or physical variables, structures, and processes that 
intervene between the system’s inputs and outputs. For this reason, these questions are 
particularly important for the purposes of intervening on a system’s behavior. 
Knowledge of a state si or a transition si→sj that mediates the overall transition between 
‘input’ and ‘output’ can be used to influence that overall transition by changing either 
one of si or si→sj. Likewise, knowledge of the fact that either si or si→sj is physically 
realized in some physical structure pk can be used to achieve the same goal by, for 
example, replacing pk with some other physical structure pl, or by removing pk 
altogether.14 
In order to better understand the way in which creators should go about 
answering how- and where-questions in the Machine Learning context, it is instructive to
first consider the way these questions are answered in cognitive science. There, answers 
to how-questions are typically delivered by developing cognitive models which describe 
the processes that govern a particular system’s behavior. Notably, the relevant 
processes are only rarely described in terms of “brute causal” interactions between 
neuronal structures. More commonly, they are described in terms of the numeric 
calculation of values, or the step-wise transition between states (Busemeyer & 
Diederich, 2010). The most important advantage of such descriptions is that they are 
able to capture a system’s abstract mathematical properties. However, in some cases 
they also afford relatively straightforward semantic interpretations (Fodor, 1987). That 
is, certain variables or states of a cognitive model might be said to represent specific 
features of the environment, so that changes in those variables or transitions between 
those states capture changes in the things being represented. That said, 
representational interpretations may not always be forthcoming—for example, because 
it is unclear which features of the environment are actually being represented (Ramsey, 
1997)—nor useful—in particular, when the non-representational description is deemed 
sufficiently useful for the purposes of interpreting, predicting, and intervening on the 
system’s behavior (Chemero, 2000).
In turn, where-questions in cognitive science are typically answered by localizing 
the elements of a cognitive model—i.e., its individual states, state-transitions, variables, 
or calculations—in specific physical structures such as neurons, neural populations, or 
brain regions (Piccinini & Craver, 2011; Zednik, 2017). Although cognitive scientists had 
long denigrated the explanatory relevance of where-questions (Pylyshyn, 1984), it is now
widely acknowledged that a proper understanding of the brain is critically important for 
the purposes of explaining the mind (Shallice & Cooper, 2011). That said, it would be a 
mistake to think that localization in cognitive science is typically “direct” in the sense of 
affording simple one-to-one mappings between the individual steps of a process and the
parts of an underlying physical structure (Bechtel & Richardson, 1993). Indeed, the 
14 Although there is a clear sense in which interventions can also be achieved by modifying a system’s 
inputs—a different sin will typically lead to a different sout—interventions on the mediating states, 
transitions, or realizers are likely to be far more wide-ranging and systematic.
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functional boundaries between the elements of cognitive models frequently cut across 
the physical boundaries between physical structures in the brain (Stinson, 2016). 
Although this should not be taken to indicate that the answering of where-questions is 
impossible or unimportant, it does show that close attention should be paid to the sense
in which, for example, the states and state-transitions of a particular process—and thus, 
possibly, the corresponding representations and representation-manipulations—might 
be distributed (Clark, 1993).
5.2. Creators
How might this brief foray into the explanatory norms and practices of cognitive science 
be relevant to Machine Learning? Like scientists working to explain the behavior of 
biological cognizers, the creators of an ML-programmed computing system are 
frequently preoccupied with questions about how and where. On the one hand, software
engineers and system administrators tasked with developing, maintaining, fixing, and 
generally improving a system’s behavior need to know not only what that system does, 
but also how it does it. On the other hand, hardware engineers charged with building 
and maintaining the hardware in which the system is implemented must know where 
certain processes could be, or are actually, localized. Notably, much about the way in 
which how- and where-questions are answered in cognitive science can be used to better
understand the way these questions can and should be answered in Explainable AI.
Consider how-questions first. Just as in cognitive science it is only rarely useful to 
look for “brute-causal” interactions between neuronal structures, in the Machine 
Learning context it is only rarely useful to cite the values of individual learnable 
parameters such as a neural network’s unit activations or connection weights. Indeed, as 
has already been discussed in Section 2, their high-dimensional complexity makes many 
ML-programmed computing systems unpredictable even with complete knowledge of 
the underlying parameter values. Moreover, there is often no way of knowing in advance 
whether an intervention on a single parameter will change the relevant system’s 
behavior entirely, or else affect it in a way that is mostly or entirely imperceptible.
Like in cognitive science, therefore, suitable answers to how-questions in 
Explainable AI will in most cases describe abstract mathematical properties of the 
system whose behavior is being explained. To better understand the kinds of properties 
that might be sought, consider once again the loan risk assessment system from above. 
In order to track statistical correlations between previous applicants’ personal data and 
their ability to repay loans, the risk assessment system is unlikely to categorize new 
applicants on the basis of simple linear combinations of inputs such as age and income. 
Rather, the system is more likely to deploy a taxomony of abstract categories in which 
the inputs are combined nonlinearly (see also Buckner, 2018). For illustrative purposes, it
can help to assume that these categories approximately correspond to folk-
psychological character traits such as honest, unscrupulous, high self-control, persevering, 
or foolhardy. Although an applicant who once was the victim of a ponzi scheme may 
appear inconspicuous to a bank employee, the automated risk assessment system might,
through a nonlinear combination of data points, nevertheless classify that applicant as 
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being foolhardy, and for this reason, risky. In order to properly understand how this 
system does what it does—and thus, in order to potentially intervene on the system’s 
behavior—creators would almost certainly profit from identifying the system’s learned 
categories, and from characterizing the role these categories play in the generation of 
particular outputs.
Now, consider where-questions. Recall that questions of this kind were long 
denigrated in cognitive science. Because many ML applications are driven by standard-
issue hardware components, it may be tempting to dismiss where-questions as being 
similarly irrelevant to Explainable AI. But it is important to resist this temptation. Indeed,
a growing number of ML applications are driven by ML-specific hardware components. 
For example, the artificial neural networks used for visual processing in self-driving cars 
are increasingly implemented on neuromorphic hardware devices that have considerable
advantages with respect to speed and power consumption (Pfeiffer & Pfeil, 2018). In this
sense, where-questions are hugely important at least for creators tasked with choosing 
the hardware in which to implement a particular computing system. But where-
questions can also be important for creators tasked with maintaining, repairing, or 
improving a computing system once it has been built and deployed. Knowing the 
physical location in which certain kinds of data are stored and processed can allow 
creators to selectively replace hardware components so as to improve the speed or 
efficiency of the system as a whole. Moreover, in certain scenarios, it may even be 
important to know where data are processed after the system has stopped working. For 
example, in the aftermath of a fatal accident involving a self-driving car, it may be 
necessary to extract the data that was processed in the moments immediately preceding
the accident, even if the system is no longer operational.15 In such scenarios, a creator’s 
ability to answer questions about where certain operations were performed may be 
instrumental for answering further questions about what the system was doing, as well 
as why and how.
Surprisingly perhaps, where-questions may sometimes even be important to 
stakeholders other than creators. Although many computing systems are colloquially 
said to be realized “in the cloud”, what is actually meant is that they are implemented in 
a device (or a cluster of devices) that is physically far-removed from the stakeholders in 
the relevant ecosystem. Given the differences in the ways different countries regulate 
the storage of information, data- and decision-subjects alike may want to know the 
particular jurisdiction under which—i.e., where in the world—their data is being stored 
and processed. In a related way, examiners may be tasked with developing and enforcing
legislation that limits the extent to which data can be exported. Thus, whereas where-
questions are typically within the purview of creators, there are situations in which these
questions may also become important to other stakeholders within the ML ecosystem.
5.3. Feature-detector identification
One technique for answering how- and possibly even where-questions involves the 
15 Curiously, in such scenarios a computing system's hardware components become analogous to the 
"black box" voice-recorders used on commercial airliners.
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identification of feature-detectors. Just as what- and why-questions can be answered by 
highlighting features of the input that bear a high responsibility for the production of 
certain outputs, how-questions can sometimes be answered by highlighting those 
features of the input that are most responsible for activity in certain mediating 
variables. Insofar as the relevant variables are sensitive to a particular feature (i.e., 
respond reliably when the feature is present), relatively unique (i.e., no other mediating 
variables are similarly sensitive), and causally efficacious (i.e., they significantly influence 
the system’s overall output), those variables can be viewed as feature-detectors. 
Identifying a system’s feature-detectors—assuming there are any—and exploring their 
influence on the system’s overall behavior serves well for the purposes of answering 
questions about how that system works, and sometimes, even about where the relevant 
feature-detecting operations are carried out.
Consider a recent study due to Bau et al (2018). This study considers generative 
adversarial networks (GANs) that are capable of producing photorealistic images of 
scenes depicting, for example, christian churches (Figure 5a). The aim of the study is to 
identify feature-detectors and explore the systematic effects of surgical interventions 
on these detectors.16 To this end, Bau et al. “dissect” the relevant networks to identify 
the units or unit clusters that are sensitive and unique with respect to recognizable 
features such as trees (Figure 5b). Subsequently, they determine the causal efficacy of 
these (clusters of) units by performing a series of interventions such as activating or 
ablating (i.e., de-activating) the relevant units. Indeed, through these kinds of 
interventions the authors are able to systematically control the presence or absence of 
features in the generated images, without compromising the overall image quality 
(Figures 5c and 5d).
16 Strictly speaking, because the aim of the GANs in this study is not detection but generation, the 
relevant units might more appropriately be called feature-generators.
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Bau et al.’s study exhibits many of the hallmarks of well-answered how-questions. 
For one, it shows that interventions on feature-detectors can be used to repair or 
otherwise improve the relevant system’s performance—a typical task for creators. For 
example, by identifying and subsequently ablating the feature-detectors for unwanted 
visual artifacts such as textured patterns where there should be none, they are able to 
successfully remove those artifacts from the generated images and therefore improve 
the system’s overall performance. For another, most of the features being detected by 
the networks in the study are robust with respect to nuisance variations in color, texture 
and spatial orientation. Thus, the GANs appear to learn just the kinds of high-level 
representations that one would expect to find in high-dimensional complex systems 
programmed using Machine Learning. Indeed, the authors even advance the hypothesis 
that the networks’ representations resemble the conceptual representations that are 
used by human brains (see also: Buckner, 2018).
As this example shows, the identification of feature-detectors is an effective 
technique for answering how-questions in the ML ecosystem. That said, it is worth 
considering the extent to which this technique might also be used to answer where-
questions. Indeed, insofar as a network’s feature-detectors are concentrated in a 
relatively small number of units and those units are implemented in neuromorphic 
hardware components, the identification of feature detectors will answer questions 
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Figure 5. Images generated by a generative adversarial network: 
(a) generated images of christian churches and their surroundings; 
(b) features detected by the feature-detector for trees; (c) images 
generated after ablating the feature-detector for trees; (d) images 
generated after activating the feature-detector for trees. 
Reproduced from Bau et al. 2018.
about how and where simultaneously. Indeed, in such cases, modifications to the 
networks’ overall behavior could equally be achieved by, for example, removing or 
replacing the hardware components that implement specific detectors.
5.4. Diagnostic classification
Feature-detectors can be invoked to answer questions about how and even where, but 
only when the responsibility for generating particular outputs is concentrated in a 
relatively small number of system variables (e.g., a small number of network units). In 
contrast, they cannot normally be invoked when the responsibility is distributed accross 
a large number of variables (e.g., a layer or network as a whole). Indeed, decades-long 
discussions of connectionist modeling methods in cognitive science suggest that neural 
networks and similarly high-dimensional systems are very likely to exhibit this kind of 
distributed responsibility (Smolensky, 1988), and thus, are likely to deploy distributed 
representations (Clark, 1993). For this reason, investigators in Explainable AI have good 
reason to develop alternative techniques that can be used to answer how-questions 
even when no clearly circumscribed feature-detectors can be found.
Consider a recent study from computational linguistics, in which Hupkes et al. 
(2018) explore the capacity of different networks to evaluate expressions with nested 
grammatical structures. It has long been known that simple recurrent networks (SRNs, 
Elman, 1990), like other networks with recurrent feedback connections, perform well 
when confronted with tasks of this nature. What remains unclear, however, is exactly 
how these networks do what they do, and in particular, how they store and deploy 
information over extended periods of time. To wit, assuming that a nested arithmetic 
expression such as “(5-((2-3)+7))” is processed from left to right, some symbols 
encountered early (e.g., the ‘5’ and the leading ‘-’) will have to be evaluated only after 
other symbols are encountered later.
Hupkes et al.’s challenge is to determine whether networks capable of evaluating 
such nested expressions do so by following either one of two strategies: a recursive 
strategy in which parenthetical clauses are evaluated only once they have been closed 
(2-3=-1; -1+7=6; 5-6=-1), or a cumulative strategy, in which parentheses are removed from
left to right while appropriately “flipping” the operators between ‘+’ and ‘-’ (5-2=3; 
3+3=6; 6-7=-1). In order to answer this question about how the relevant networks do 
what they do, Hupkes et al. deploy diagnostic classifiers: secondary networks that take as 
inputs the primary network’s hidden-unit activations while a particular symbol is being 
processed, and that generate as output a value that can be compared to a prior 
hypothesis about the information that should be represented at that moment. In the 
present example, the diagnostic classifiers’ outputs are compared to the information 
that should be represented if the recurrent network were to follow either one of the 
relevant strategies. For example, after processing the ‘3’ in the arithmetic expression 
“(5-((2-3)+7))”, a recurrent network that adheres to the recursive strategy should 
represent an intermediate sum of -1, whereas one that follows the cumulative strategy 
should represent a 6. Indeed, Hupkes et al. find that the diagnostic classifiers generate 
outputs more in line with the cumulative strategy than with the recursive strategy 
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(Figure 6).
Like feature-detectors, diagnostic classifiers can be used to answer questions 
about how a particular system does what it does. More precisely, they can be used to 
determine which information is represented by a system when it receives a particular 
input, and thus, how that network processes information as the inputs change over time.
In a sense, therefore, diagnostic classifiers can be used to trace the particular computer 
program—in this case understood as a series of transitions between information-bearing
states—that is executed by networks that are capable of solving complex problems in AI.
Diagnostic classification has at least one important advantage over techniques 
that center on feature-detectors, but also some significant disadvantages. On the one 
hand, diagnostic classifiers do not require that the representations in the relevant 
system be contained in a small number of variables. For this reason, they appear well-
suited for answering how-questions even when—as is often likely to be the case—
networks solve AI problems by manipulating distributed representations. On the other 
hand, diagnostic classifiers may be thought to be of comparatively limited explanatory 
value with respect to how-questions insofar as they do not afford the ability to intervene
on these systems’ behavior. Whereas feature-detectors can be ablated or activated, and 
the resultant effects can be recorded, it is not clear how a diagnostic classifier’s outputs 
can be used to systematically modify a system’s behavior. Moreover, whereas in certain 
cases feature-detectors may be cited to answer where-questions in addition to 
answering how-questions, diagnostic classifiers are unlikely to address the former other 
than by indicating that certain representations are realized somewhere within the 
system as a whole.
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Figure 6. Diagnostic classifier outputs (y-axis) for the cumulative 
(top) and recursive (bottom) strategies over the course of two 
distinct expressions (x-axis). The classifiers’ outputs (solid line) are 
compared to the prior hypotheses (dashed line), revealing an over-
all closer fit to the cumulative than to the recursive strategy. 
Reproduced from Hupkes et al. (2018).
6. Conclusion
This discussion has sought to develop a normative framework for Explainable Artificial 
Intelligence—a set of requirements that should be satisfied for the purposes of 
rendering opaque computing systems transparent. Beginning with an analysis of 
‘opacity’ from philosophy of science, it was shown that opacity is agent-relative, that that
rendering transparent involves acquiring knowledge of epistemically relevant elements. 
Notably, given their distinct roles in the Machine Learning ecosystem, different 
stakeholders were shown to require knowledge of different (albeit equally “real”) 
epistemically relevant elements. In this sense, although the opacity of ML-programmed 
computing systems is traditionally said to give rise to the Black Box Problem, it may in 
fact be more appropriate to speak of many Black Box Problems. Depending on who you 
are and how it is that you interact with an ML-programmed computer, that computer will 
be opaque for different reasons, and must be rendered transparent in different ways.
Explainable Artificial Intelligence is in the business of developing analytic 
techniques with which to render opaque computing systems transparent, and thus, to 
allow the stakeholders in an ML ecosystem to better develop, operate, trust, examine, 
and otherwise interact with ML-programmed computing systems. But although many 
powerful analytic techniques have already been developed, not enough is known about 
when and how these techniques actually explain—that is, when and in which sense these
techniques render computing systems transparent. Here, the present discussion sought 
inspiration in cognitive science. As one of the most influential normative frameworks for 
evaluating the explanatory successes of analytic techniques in cognitive science and 
neuroscience, Marr’s levels of analysis account was used to determine what it takes to 
satisfy the distinct explanatory requirements of different stakeholders in the ML 
ecosystem. By aligning these stakeholders with different kinds of questions—
specifically, questions about what, why, how, and where—and by specifying the kinds of 
EREs that should be invoked in order to answer these questions, it was possible to 
develop a normative framework with which to evaluate the explanatory contributions of 
analytic techniques from Explainable AI.
Finally, by reviewing a series of illustrative examples, it was argued that many 
opaque computing systems can already be rendered transparent in the sense required 
by specific stakeholders. This review demonstrated that it is increasingly possible to not 
only answer operators’ questions about what a computing system is doing, but to also 
answer data- and decision-subjects’ questions about why, as well as creators’ and 
examiners’ questions about how the system does what it does, and in certain 
circumstances, even questions about where. Thus, Explainable AI appears to be well-
equipped for answering the questions that are most likely to be asked by different 
stakeholders, and thus, for finding solutions to the many Black Box Problems.
That said, it is important to recognize that the analytic techniques that have thus 
far been developed have certain characteristic limitations—as well as to consider 
whether, and if so how, these limitations might eventually be overcome. As was the case 
for input heatmapping, the techniques of diagnostic classification and feature-detector-
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identification work relatively well when a system’s variables can be interpreted 
semantically—that is, when they can be thought to represent recognizable features of 
the environment. Indeed, feature-detectors are only as informative as the features being
detected can be recognized by human observers, and diagnostic classifiers require 
investigators to already possess a detailed understanding of the programs that might be 
executed by the system whose behavior is being explained. As has already been 
suggested, however, there are reasons to believe that the environmental features being 
detected and the correlations being learned through the use of Machine Learning may 
be subtle and difficult to interpret. For this reason, although promising, these XAI 
techniques are likely to be limited in scope and utility.
To what extent can this scope and utility be increased? Here it may once again be 
worth seeking guidance in cognitive science. There, one long-term trend is the gradual 
recognition that semantic interpretability is not always necessary to explain the behavior
of humans and other biological cognizers. Indeed, it is now far less widely assumed than 
before that the neuronal processes described by cognitive models should—or even can
—be described in semantic terms (Chemero, 2000; Ramsey, 1997). For this reason, many 
cognitive models today instead deploy sophisticated mathematical concepts and analytic
techniques for idealizing, approximating, or otherwise reducing the dimensionality of 
the systems being investigated, even if they do not thereby render these systems 
semantically interpretable. Although the use of these concepts and techniques may 
render folk psychological categories inapplicable, they might nevertheless be used to 
satisfy important explanatory norms such as description, prediction, and intervention.
In conclusion, it seems fair to wonder whether Explainable AI might similarly move
away from semantic interpretability, and toward idealization, approximation, and 
dimension-reduction. On the one hand, Artificial Intelligence is in part an engineering 
discipline tasked with developing technologies that improve the daily lives of regular 
individuals. For this reason, it is subject to constraints that pure sciences are not. 
Whereas it may not be important for laypeople to understand the processes that 
underlie visual perception, it is important that they know why their loan applications are 
getting rejected. On the other hand, just as society trusts scientists to possess expert 
knowledge that remains inaccessible to laypeople, it may accept that certain ML 
applications can only be explained by mastering the most sophisticated XAI techniques. 
In this case, it may be necessary to rely on societal mechanisms—for example, the 
testimony of an expert witness in a court of law—to ensure that an individual’s rights are
being protected even when that individual cannot him- or herself come to know the 
relevant facts. Thus, although semantic interpretability may often be beneficial, it may 
not always be essential.
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